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Undetectable Cyber Attacks on Communication Links in Multi-Agent
Cyber-Physical Systems
Mahdi Taheri1, Khashayar Khorasani1, Iman Shames2, and Nader Meskin3
Abstract— The objective in this paper is to study and develop
conditions for a network of multi-agent cyber-physical systems
(MAS) where a malicious adversary can utilize vulnerabilities
in order to ensure and maintain cyber attacks undetectable. We
classify these cyber attacks as undetectable in the sense that
their impact cannot be observed in the generated residuals. It is
shown if an agent that is the root of a rooted spanning tree in the
MAS graph is under a cyber attack, the attack is undetectable
by the entire network. Next we investigate if a non-root agent
is compromised, then under certain conditions cyber attacks
can become detectable. Moreover, a novel cyber attack that
is designated as quasi-covert cyber attack is introduced that
can be used to eliminate detectable impacts of cyber attacks to
the entire network and maintain these attacks as undetected.
Finally, an event-triggered based detector is proposed that can
be used to detect the quasi-covert cyber attacks. Numerical
simulations are provided to illustrate the effectiveness and
capabilities of our proposed methodologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent systems (MAS) have wide range of applica-
tions as in smart grids, transportation systems, internet of
things (IoT), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Due to
their wide range of applications these cyber systems have
been studied during the past two decades [1]–[3]. One of the
main problems in MAS is to reach consensus in a distributed
manner. This problem has been addressed in the literature
for various types of agents. In [4], [5], observer-based con-
sensus protocols have been proposed. Distributed consensus
protocols require agents to transmit their information to the
neighboring agents through a communication network. This
communication network is prone and has vulnerabilities to
cyber attacks.
In recent years, addressing security related problems of
cyber-physical systems (CPS) has been a challenging issue
[6]–[11]. In [6], [7], frameworks to study various types of
cyber attacks on linear time-invariant (LTI) systems have
been proposed. The impact of a certain type of cyber attack
on MAS in which the adversary uses the model of the
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system to generate its attack signals has been studied in
[10]. It is shown if the root of the directed spanning tree
contained in the network graph is under “cyber-physical”
attacks, the entire MAS can become unstable. In [12], a
distributed methodology to detect cyber attacks on commu-
nication networks among interconnected systems and MAS
that are equipped with consensus-based controllers has been
proposed. However, conditions under which the adversary is
capable of performing undetectable cyber attacks in MAS
has not been investigated in above references.
To increase security and reduce consumption of energy,
one can employ an event-triggered protocol so agents in
MAS can communicate with one another. In [13]–[15], var-
ious types of event-triggered observer-based methodologies
have been proposed for linear MAS and LTI systems. The
work in [16] has studied an event-triggered unit that can be
used to simultaneously reach a consensus and detect faults
in MAS.
In this paper, our goal is to investigate conditions under
which cyber attacks on communication links of multi-agent
CPS become undetectable. The MAS under having a directed
communication graph is equipped with consensus-based ob-
servers that are under false data injection attacks. Our first
objective is to show that if an adversary attacks the root
of the directed spanning tree of the communication graph
with a certain attack signal, all the agents follow that attack
signal and reach a new consensus point. This implies that one
is injecting and introducing an undetectable cyber attack in
the sense that residual signals in presence of cyber attacks
approach to zero as time approaches to infinity.
Next, we investigate detectability conditions of cyber
attacks on various teams of agents in case that non-root
agents are under cyber attacks. Since attacking a non-root
agent can become detectable to a certain group of agents,
a cyber attack methodology that is denoted as “quasi-covert
cyber attack” is introduced. Through this novel cyber attack,
the adversary can use it to eliminate the impacts of cyber
attacks on agents that can detect cyber attacks. Consequently,
by performing quasi-covert attacks on non-root agents, the
adversary is capable of concealing his/her attacks and making
them undetectable. Finally, an event-triggered detector is
proposed in this work that under certain conditions can be
used to generate residuals that are sensitive to cyber attack
signals even in presence of injection of quasi-covert cyber
attacks.
The main contributions of this paper are threefold. First,
a definition is introduced and proposed that specifies char-
acteristics of undetectable cyber attacks on MAS. Then
conditions on the graph topology and its Laplacian ma-
trix along with detectors of MAS are developed so that
an adversary is capable of performing undetectable cyber
attacks. Moreover, if the above does not hold, we investigate
under what conditions cyber attacks are detectable on a
certain team of agents. Second, quasi-covert cyber attacks
are introduced where malicious hackers can inject in order
to maintain their attacks undetected provided only non-root
agents are compromised. Finally, an event-triggered detector
is proposed for quasi-covert cyber attacks that given its event-
based communication strategy is more secure in comparison
with conventional communication protocols.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Graph Theory
A directed graph (digraph) G is defined with a set of
vertices or nodes V = {1, 2, . . . , N} and the set E ⊂ V ×V
that denotes the edges of the digraph. The pair of distinct
vertices G : (i, j) ∈ E defines an edge. Graph G is called
directed if (i, j) ∈ E does not imply (j, i) ∈ E . The matrix
A = [aij ] ∈ RN×N denotes the adjacency matrix of G,
where aij = 1 when there exists a link from node j to
i. The set Ni denotes the set of neighbors of the node i
which contains those nodes that have an edge to i. Moreover,
|Ni| = di, where | · | is the cardinality of the set. The
Laplacian matrix of the graph G is defined as L = D −A,
where D = diag(d1, d2, . . . , dN ) denotes the in-degree
matrix. A directed path between nodes i and j, that is denoted
by Pij , is a sequence of edges that connects the node i to
the node j and follows along the direction of edges.
B. Model of MAS and State Estimation Module
The dynamics of MAS consisting of N agents is given by
x˙i(t) = Axi(t) +Bui(t),
yi(t) = Cxi(t), i = 1, . . . , N,
(1)
where xi(t) ∈ Rn denotes the state of the i-th agent , ui(t) ∈
R
m denotes the control input of that agent, and yi(t) ∈ Rp
represents the output measurement of agent i. The known
matrices (A, B, C) are of appropriate dimensions and each
agent is assumed to be controllable and observable.
Since only few states of agents are assumed to be mea-
surable (p < n) one needs to design an observer-based
controller. In [4], for MAS in the form of (1) an observer-
based consensus protocol was proposed as follows:
˙ˆxi(t) =Axˆi(t) +Bui(t)− cFζi(t),
ui(t) =cKǫi(t),
(2)
where xˆi(t) ∈ Rn denotes the observer state of the i-th
agent, ζi(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
((yj(t) − yi(t)) + C(xˆi(t) − xˆj(t))),
ǫi(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
(xˆi(t)− xˆj(t)), c ∈ R is a scalar, F ∈ Rn×p
is the observer gain matrix, and K ∈ Rm×n denotes the
control gain matrix to be selected. It should be noted that
the observer (2) is a special case of that in [4] in which the
MAS do not have a leader.
Assumption 1: The directed graph G contains at least one
directed spanning tree. The set Vr = {ir, ir + 1, . . . , ir +
Nr − 1} contains agents that constitute as roots of directed
spanning trees in G and Nr denotes the number of these
agents.
Lemma 1 ( [14], [17]): The algebraic multiplicity of the
eigenvalue λ0 = 0 of the Laplacian matrix L0 that belongs
to the graph G0 is one if G0 contains a directed spanning tree.
Furthermore, the other eigenvalues have positive real parts
and the right and left eigenvectors associated with λ0 are
denoted by 1N and r0 = [r1, . . . , rN ]
⊤ ∈ RN , respectively,
where
∑N
j=1 rj = 1 with scalar rj .
Definition 1: For the MAS (1), consensus is achieved if
for any initial condition
lim
t→∞
‖yi(t)− yj(t)‖ = 0, lim
t→∞
‖xˆi(t)− xˆj(t)‖ = 0,
∀ i, j = 1, . . . , N , where ‖.‖ denotes the Euclidean norm.
It has been shown in [4] that if the Assumption 1 holds, the
observer and control parameters in (2) can be designed such
that the closed-loop system reaches a consensus in sense of
the Definition 1.
Assumption 2: Parameters of the observer-based consen-
sus protocol (2) are designed such that conditions in Theorem
4 in [4] are satisfied. Hence, the closed-loop system (1) and
(2) reach a consensus under cyber attack free conditions.
Lemma 2 ( [14]): Given the Hurwitz matrix H ∈
R
n×n, there exists a nonsingular matrix PH that satisfies
P−1H HPH = JH and ‖eHt‖ ≤ ‖PH‖‖P−1H ‖cHeλ
m
Ht, ∀ t ≥ 0,
where JH denotes the Jordan canonical form of H , cH > 0
is a positive constant, and maxRe(λ(H)) < λmH < 0.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Cyber Attacks on MAS and Residual Generation
The state estimator (2) for the i-th agent receives in-
formation from the agent j ∈ Ni that is represented as
pair pji(t) = (xˆj(t), yj(t)). Since the communication links
among agents are vulnerable to cyber attacks, the adversary
is capable of injecting attack signals ajixˆ (t) ∈ Rn and
ajiy (t) ∈ Rp to pji(t). Therefore, the agent i under cyber
attacks receives the manipulated pair paji(t) = (xˆj(t) +
ajixˆ (t), yj(t) + a
ji
y (t)) from the agent j.
Assumption 3: We consider the worst case scenario cyber
attack in which case all the incoming communication links
of a given agent are being compromised.
Remark 1: Cyber attacks on MAS in this paper can be
considered as the “man-in-the-middle” type of attack [18].
In this cyber attack type the adversary first blocks the
received information from a group of neighboring agents of
a compromised agent. Following this the adversaries inject
their attack signals as legitimate information that are then
received from a group of neighboring agents and transmitted
to the targeted agent.
Consequently, the closed-loop equations of the MAS (1)
and the observer (2) under cyber attacks can be represented
in the following form:
x˙i(t) = Axi(t) +BcKǫi(t)−BcK
∑
j∈Ni
qia
ji
xˆ (t), (3)
˙ˆxi(t) = Axˆi(t) +BcKǫi(t)− cFζi(t)−BcK
∑
j∈Ni
qia
ji
xˆ (t)
−cF
∑
j∈Ni
qi(a
ji
y (t)− Cajixˆ (t)), i = 1, . . . , N, (4)
where qi = 1 if the incoming communication links to the
agent i are compromised and under cyber attack, and qi = 0,
otherwise.
To detect anomalies in the i-th agent or its neighboring
agents one can utilize the received information from the
neighboring agents and generate the following residual sig-
nals:
resiy(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
‖(yj(t)− yi(t)) + qiajiy (t)‖, (5)
resixˆ(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
‖(xˆi(t)− xˆj(t))− qiajixˆ (t)‖. (6)
B. Objectives
We are pursuing three main objectives in this paper. First,
we introduce a formal definition for undetectable cyber at-
tacks on MAS in the sense that residuals (5) and (6) converge
to zero as time approaches to infinity. Following that we
show that under certain conditions on the network the cyber
attacks on a given agent which happens to be the root of the
communication graph can become undetectable. The second
objective is to introduce a novel type of undetectable cyber
attacks that are designated as quasi-covert cyber attacks in
which if a group of non-root agents are compromised, still
the adversary is capable of eliminating and hiding the impact
of cyber attacks on agents that could otherwise detect them.
The final objective is to develop an event-triggered based
detector with the goal of detecting quasi-covert cyber attack
signals that are developed in the second objective.
IV. UNDETECTABLE CYBER ATTACKS
In this section, conditions to introduce and inject unde-
tectable cyber attacks are investigated and developed. Let us
define Aˇ = I2 ⊗A, Kˇ = I2 ⊗ cK , Cˇ = I2 ⊗ C, and
Bˇ =
[
0 B
0 B
]
, Fˇ =
[
0 0
cF −cF
]
,
Bˇa =
[ −BcK 0
−BcK − cFC cF
]
.
(7)
By utilizing (7) and augmenting the dynamics (3) and (4)
yields:
˙ˇxi(t) =Aˇxˇi(t) + (BˇKˇ − Fˇ Cˇ)
∑
j∈Ni
(xˇi(t)− xˇj(t))
+ Bˇaaˇi(t),
(8)
where xˇi(t) = [xi(t)
⊤, xˆi(t)
⊤]⊤, aˇi(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
qiaˇji, and
aˇji(t) = [a
ji
xˆ (t)
⊤, ajiy (t)
⊤]⊤.
Definition 2: The cyber attacks on communication links
in the MAS (8) are undetectable by the entire network if the
MAS reaches a consensus under attack free conditions, i.e.,
aˇi(t) = 0, according to the Definition 1, and in presence of
cyber attacks, i.e., aˇi(t) 6= 0, ∀ t > 0, the following equations
are satisfied:
lim
t→∞
‖yi(t)− yj(t)− qiajiy (t)‖ = 0, (9)
lim
t→∞
‖xˆi(t)− xˆj(t)− qiajixˆ (t)‖ = 0, (10)
∀ i, j = 1, . . . , N .
Remark 2: If aˇi(t) = 0 and the MAS reaches a consen-
sus, the residuals (5) and (6) converge to zero as t→∞ as
expected since no cyber attack is injected to the system. If in
presence of cyber attacks, i.e., aˇi(t) 6= 0, equations (9) and
(10) are satisfied, it can be inferred that limt→∞ res
i
y(t) = 0
and limt→∞ res
i
xˆ(t) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N . Consequently,
the cyber attack is undetectable.
Theorem 1: Under Assumptions 1-3, let the cyber attacks
on the agent i in (8) be selected as ajixˆ (t) = a0 − xˆj(t) and
ajiy (t) = Ca0 − yj(t) for j ∈ Ni, where a0 ∈ Rn is a
constant vector. The above cyber attacks are undetectable by
all agents if i ∈ Vr, and A + BcK and A + λ˜rkcFC for
k = 2, . . . , N + 1 are Hurwitz, where λ˜rk 6= 0 is the k-th
eigenvalue of the matrix
L˜r =
[
0 01×N
−Dr Lr
]
,
where Dr = [0
⊤
i−1, di, 0
⊤
N−i]
⊤, Lr = L + QrA, Qr =
diag(0i−1, qi,0N−i), and 0m×n ∈ Rm×n denotes a matrix
with all entries equal to 0.
Proof: By adding the cyber attack signals to (8) and
augmenting the dynamics of agents, one obtains
˙ˇx(t) = (IN ⊗ Aˇ+ Lr ⊗ (BˇKˇ − Fˇ Cˇ))xˇ(t) +Dr ⊗ Bˇaˇ0,
where xˇ(t) = [xˇ1(t)
⊤, xˇ2(t)
⊤, . . . , xˇN (t)
⊤]⊤, aˇ0 =
[a⊤0 , (Ca0)
⊤]⊤. One can consider the adversary as a virtual
agent that transmits its information a0 and Ca0 to the i-
th agent. Since from the agent i there exists paths to the
rest of N − 1 agents the virtual adversary agent is the
root of a directed spanning tree that is contained in the
graph Gr with L˜r as its Laplacian matrix. Hence, the state
space representation of the MAS augmented with the virtual
adversary agent can be represented as follows:
˙˜xr(t) = (I˜r ⊗ Aˇ+ L˜r ⊗ (BˇKˇ − Fˇ Cˇ))x˜r(t),
where x˜r(t) = [1
⊤
2 ⊗ a⊤0 , xˇ(t)⊤]⊤, I˜r =
[
0 01×N
0N IN
]
, and
1n ∈ Rn denotes a vector with all its elements equal to 1.
In similar manner as in [5], the disagreement vector δr(t) =
x˜r(t)− (1N+1r˜⊤r ⊗ I2n)x˜r(t) is defined, where r˜r is the left
eigenvector of L˜r as defined in the Lemma 1. Consequently,
we obtain
δ˙r(t) = (I˜r ⊗ Aˇ+ L˜r ⊗ (BˇKˇ − Fˇ Cˇ))δr(t). (11)
It can be shown from the definition of δr(t) that δr(t) = 0
if and only if 12 ⊗ a0 = xˇ1(t) = xˇ2(t) = · · · = xˇN (t).
Therefore, if (11) is stable, one can conclude that all the
agents reach a0 corresponding to the consensus set point.
From Lemma 1 and considering that Gr contains a directed
spanning tree it follows that there exist matrices T ∈
R
N+1×N+1, Y ∈ RN+1×N , W ∈ RN×N+1, and block
diagonal matrix ∆ ∈ RN×N with diagonal entries equal to
nonzero eigenvalues of L˜r such that [5]:
T = [1N+1 Y ], T
−1 =
[
r˜⊤
W
]
, T−1L˜T = J =
[
0 01×N
0N ∆
]
.
Let us define ε(t) = (T−1 ⊗ I2n)δr(t) =
[ε1(t)
⊤, ε2:N+1(t)
⊤]⊤. It follows from Lemma 1 and
definition of δr(t) that ε1(t) = 02n and
ε˙2:N+1(t) = (IN ⊗ Aˇ+∆⊗ (BˇKˇ − Fˇ Cˇ))ε2:N+1(t). (12)
It is easy to show that the matrices IN ⊗ Aˇ+ λ˜rk ⊗ (BˇKˇ −
Fˇ Cˇ) for k = 2, . . . , N + 1 having a similar structure to[
A+ λ˜rkcFC 0n×n
−λ˜rkcFC A+BcK
]
.
Consequently, if A + BcK and A + λ˜rkcFC for k =
2, . . . , N +1 are Hurwitz, (11) is stable and states of all the
agents reach a0 as t→∞. Hence, according to the Definition
2, the cyber attacks are undetectable from the entire network.
A. Cyber Attacks Injected to Non-Root Agents
In this subsection, cyber attacks that are injected to the
communication links of agents that do not belong to the set
Vr are investigated.
Definition 3: The agents in the network that are directly
under cyber attacks and their incoming communication chan-
nels are compromised are included in the set Vda = {ia, ia+
1, . . . , ia + Nda − 1}, where Nda is the number of directly
attacked agents.
Definition 4 ( [19]): The reachable subgraph of the ver-
tex i, R(i), is defined as the vertex subgraph that contains
the node i and all reachable nodes from it.
Definition 5: The directed path between the vertices i and
j, denoted by Pij , is a directed healthy path if none of
the communication links on this path is compromised by
adversaries.
By utilizing the Definitions 3-5, agents in the network
can be partitioned into two groups. For agents from the
root nodes of the directed tree, i.e., the set Vr, there ex-
ist directed healthy paths that constitute the first group.
Agents in this group are designated as “uncompromised”
where their states can be stacked into the vector xnc(t) =
[xˇ1(t)
⊤, xˇ2(t)
⊤, . . . , xˇNnc(t)
⊤]⊤. The second group consists
of the remaining network agents. This group contains agents
in the vertex subgraphs of directly attacked agents, i.e., the
set Vda, such that there does not exist any directed healthy
path among agents in Vr and these nodes. The agents that
belong to this group are designated as “attacked” agents and
xa(t) = [xˇNnc+1(t)
⊤, xˇNnc+2(t)
⊤, . . . , xˇN (t)
⊤]⊤ represents
the states of this group. The subscripts “nc” and “a” are
employed to denote the Nnc uncompromised agents and
the Na attacked agents, respectively. Without loss of any
generality, we assume that the first Nnc agents are not
under cyber attacks. Consequently, the Laplacian matrix is
partitioned into the following form:
L =
[
Lnc lnca
lanc La
]
, (13)
where Lnc ∈ RNnc×Nnc , La ∈ RNa×Na , lnca ∈ RNnc×Na , and
lanc ∈ RNa×Nnc .
The state space representation of the entire MAS can now
be described in the following form:
x˙a(t) = Aaxa(t) +Aancxnc(t) +Baa(t), (14)
x˙nc(t) = Ancxnc(t) +Ancaxa(t), (15)
where Aa = INa ⊗ Aˇ + La ⊗ (BˇKˇ − Fˇ Cˇ), Aanc =
lanc ⊗ (BˇKˇ − Fˇ Cˇ), Anc = INnc ⊗ Aˇ + Lnc ⊗ (BˇKˇ −
Fˇ Cˇ), Anca = lnca ⊗ (BˇKˇ − Fˇ Cˇ), Ba = Qa ⊗ Bˇa, and
Qa = diag(qNnc+1, qNnc+2, . . . , qN ) ∈ RNa×Na is a diagonal
matrix.
Definition 6: The set of N agents is partitioned into
two subsets, namely Vnc = {1, 2, . . . , Nnc} and Va =
{Nnc+1, Nnc+2, . . . , N}, that contain uncompromised and
attacked agents, respectively.
Definition 7: The set of uncompromised agents that re-
ceive information from the set of attacked agents are defined
by Vnca = {inca, inca + 1, . . . , inca + Nnca − 1}, where
Nnca is the number of uncompromised agents that receive
information from the agents in Va. In other words, j ∈ Vnca
if and only if j ∈ Vnc and there exists i ∈ Va such that
i ∈ Nj .
Assumption 4: None of agents in the set Vr is directly
under attack, i.e., Vr ∩ Vda = 0.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that the first Nda
agents in the set Va create the set of directly attacked agents.
We are now in a position to state our main result of this
subsection.
Theorem 2: Let the Assumptions 1-4 hold and the cyber
attacks on agents in the set Vda are designed as a
ji
xˆ (t) = a0−
xˆj(t) and a
ji
y (t) = Ca0 − yj(t) for j = 1, . . . , Nnc and j ∈
Ni, where Ca0 6= limt→∞ yir(t), a0 6= limt→∞ xir(t), and
a0 ∈ Rn is a constant vector. Consequently, the following
can be stated:
1) The cyber attacks are undetectable on the set of nodes
Va if A+BcK and A+ λ˜kcFC for k = 2, . . . , Na+1
are Hurwitz, where λ˜k 6= 0 denotes the k-th eigenvalue
of the Laplacian matrix
L˜a =
[
0 01×Na
−Da La
]
,
with Da = [d
nc
ia
, dncia+1, . . . , d
nc
ia+Nda−1
, 0⊤Na−Nda ]
⊤ and
dnci = |Ni ∩ Vnc| for i ∈ Vda.
2) The cyber attacks are detectable by agents that belong
to the set Vnca.
Proof: Substituting the cyber attack signals into (14)
the following can be expressed:
x˙a(t) = (INa ⊗ Aˇ+ La ⊗ (BˇKˇ − Fˇ Cˇ))xa(t) +Da ⊗ Bˇaaˇ0,
(16)
where aˇ0 = [a
⊤
0 , (Ca0)
⊤]⊤. It follows from (16) that the
nodes which belong to the set Va do not receive information
from the nodes in the set Vnc. Since the cyber attack signal
a0 is the same for all agents in the set Vda, one can
consider the adversary as a virtual agent that is the root of a
directed spanning tree contained in the graph Ga with L˜a as
its Laplacian matrix. The virtual adversary agent transmits
its information a0 and Ca0 to all the directly attacked
agents. Consequently, the dynamics of the attacked agents
augmented with the virtual adversary agent can be derived
as given below:
˙˜xa(t) = (I˜a ⊗ Aˇ+ L˜a ⊗ (BˇKˇ − Fˇ Cˇ))x˜a(t),
where x˜a(t) = [1
⊤
2 ⊗ a⊤0 , xa(t)⊤]⊤ and I˜a =[
0 01×Na
0Na INa
]
.
Following along the same steps as in the proof of the
Theorem 1 it can be concluded that if A + BcK and
A + λ˜kcFC, with k = 2, . . . , Na + 1, are Hurwitz, the
states of all agents in the set Va reach a0 as t → ∞.
Therefore, according to the Definition 2 the cyber attacks
are undetectable by agents that belong to the set Va.
Suppose all agents in (14) and (15) reach a consensus.
Following along the results previously derived it follows that
states of the attacked agents, and consequently uncompro-
mised agents, should reach a0, which contradicts the assump-
tion that Ca0 6= limt→∞ yir(t) and a0 6= limt→∞ xir(t).
Therefore, the entire network cannot reach a consensus. The
residuals for the agent j ∈ Vnc with i ∈ Va and i ∈ Nj are
nonzero as t → ∞ since xˆi(t) 6= xˆj(t) and yi(t) 6= yj(t).
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Remark 3: Suppose in Theorem 2 one has Ca0 =
limt→∞ yir(t) and a0 = limt→∞ xir(t), which implies that
the attack signals will not change the consensus set point
and follow the control objective of the MAS. Hence, it is
reasonable to assume that the control objective of adversaries
differs from the group of agents, in other words Ca0 6=
limt→∞ yir(t) and a0 6= limt→∞ xir(t).
B. Quasi-Covert Cyber Attack on the MAS Network
In the Theorem 2, it was shown that cyber attack signals
are detectable by agents that belong to the set Vnc and
receive information from agents in the set Va. Hence, if an
adversary attacks the communication channels that connect
agents in these two sets, they may be able to manipulate the
transmitted information such that impacts of cyber attacks
are made hidden and eliminated. In this paper, this attack
methodology where impacts of cyber attacks on the set Vnc
are eliminated is denoted by the “quasi-covert cyber attacks”.
Assumption 5: The adversary has knowledge on the pa-
rameters of the MAS (1) and the observer-based consensus
protocol (2).
To conceal impacts of cyber attacks on the set Vnc the
adversary needs to attack the outgoing communication links
from the nodes in the set Va to the agents that belong to Vnc.
These agents are included in the set Vnca. To achieve this,
under Assumption 5 the adversary is capable of running the
following process:
x˙ci(t) = Ax
c
i(t) +BcKǫ
c
i(t), (17)
˙ˆxci(t) = Axˆ
c
i(t) +BcKǫ
c
i − cFζci (t), (18)
for i = Nnc + 1, Nnc + 2, . . . , N , where x
c
i(t), xˆ
c
i(t) ∈ Rn,
for any arbitrary initial conditions xci(0) and xˆ
c
i(0), and
ǫci(t) =
∑
k∈Ni∩Va
(xˆci(t)− xˆck(t)) +
∑
j∈Ni∩Vnc
(xˆci(t)− xˆj(t)),
ζci (t) =
∑
k∈Ni∩Va
((Cxck(t)− Cxci (t)) + C(xˆci − xˆck(t)))
+
∑
j∈Ni∩Vnc
((yj(t)− Cxci (t)) + C(xˆci − xˆj(t))).
Lemma 3: Let the Assumptions 1-5 hold and agents in the
set Vda are under cyber attacks as specified in the Theorem
2. The adversary is capable of eliminating impacts of these
cyber attacks and make them undetectable on the set Vnca
by adding cyber attack signals aˆijxˆ (t) = xˆ
c
i(t) − xˆi(t) and
aˆijy (t) = Cx
c
i(t) − yi(t) for i ∈ Va and j ∈ Vnca to the
outgoing communication channels of agents in the set Va to
agents that belong to Vnca.
Proof: Let us define xˇci(t) = [x
c
i(t)
⊤, xˆci(t)
⊤]⊤ for i ∈
Va and xc(t) = [x
c
Nnc+1
(t)⊤, xcNnc+2(t)
⊤, . . . , xcN (t)
⊤]⊤.
Consequently, the dynamics of xc(t) can be derived as
follows:
x˙c(t) = Aaxc(t) +Aancxnc(t). (19)
By adding the cyber attack signals aˆijxˆ (t) and aˆ
ij
y (t) to the
outgoing communication channels of agents in the set Va,
(15) can be reformulated in the following form:
x˙nc(t) = Ancxnc(t) +Ancaxc(t). (20)
One can augment (19) and (20) as follows:
˙¯x(t) = (IN ⊗ Aˇ+ L⊗ (BˇKˇ − Fˇ Cˇ))x¯(t), (21)
where x¯(t) = [xnc(t)
⊤, xc(t)
⊤]⊤. If the observer-based
control protocol is designed such that the MAS reaches a
consensus, then the augmented dynamics in (21) also reaches
a consensus. Hence, according to the Definition 2, the cyber
attacks on nodes in Vda are undetectable by the entire MAS
and their impacts on agents in Vnc are eliminated.
V. EVENT-TRIGGERED CYBER ATTACK DETECTION
METHODOLOGY
A. Event-Triggered Detector Module
Our objective in this section is to interrupt disclosure
capabilities of the adversary by employing an event-triggered
protocol of information exchange among our proposed de-
tector modules.
The event-triggered detector for the i-th agent is designed
as follows:
z˙i(t) =Azzi(t) +Bzxˆi(t) + Fz
∑
j∈Ni
(e
Az(t−t
j
kj
)
zj(t
j
kj
)
− eAz(t−tiki )zi(tiki) + qziajiz (tjkj )), i = 1, . . . , N,
(22)
where zi(t) ∈ Rn is the state of detector for agent i, tiki
denotes the time of the most recent triggering event of the
agent i, ki ∈ N indicates the ki-th event on the agent i,
zi(t
i
ki
) denotes the latest broadcast state of the detector for
the i-th agent, Az is a diagonal Hurwitz matrix, and the
matrices (Az, Bz, Fz) are of appropriate dimensions that
should be designed. Also qzi = 1 indicates that the i-th
detector is under cyber attacks, and qzi = 0 if it is not under
attack, and ajiz (t
j
kj
) ∈ Rn denotes the cyber attack signal on
the received information from the neighboring agents. It is
worth noting that given the detector (22) and the consensus-
based observer (2) the agents receive output measurement
information, observer states, and detector states from their
neighboring agents.
Similar to [13], we define the state error for the i-th agent
as
ezi(t) = e
Az(t−t
i
ki
)zi(t
i
ki
)− zi(t), t ∈ [tiki , tiki+1). (23)
Moreover, the triggering function on the agent i is defined
as
f zi (t, e
z
i(t)) = ‖ezi(t)‖ − cze−αt, (24)
where cz and α are positive constants to be selected and
designed. The triggering function (24) determines the occur-
rence of an event by the agent i. Hence, f zi (t, e
z
i(t)) ≥ 0
implies that an event is triggered by the agent i. Con-
sequently, this agent updates its detector’s state such that
zi(t
i
ki+1
) = zi(t), and t
i
ki+1
= t. Subsequently, the updated
state zi(t
i
ki+1
) is broadcast to agents that agent i belongs to
their neighboring set and they use the updated state in their
detectors. Due to an event by the i-th agent, the state error
(23) of this agent is reset to zero.
One can augment states of detectors into the vector
z(t) = [z1(t)
⊤, z2(t)
⊤, . . . , zN (t)
⊤]⊤ such that dynamics
of detectors can be expressed as follows:
z˙(t) =(IN ⊗Az)z(t) + (IN ⊗Bz)xˆ(t)− L⊗ Fz(ez(t)
+ z(t)) +Qz ⊗ az(t),
(25)
where xˆ(t) = [xˆ1(t)
⊤, xˆ2(t)
⊤, . . . , xˆN (t)
⊤]⊤, ez(t) =
[ez1(t)
⊤, ez2(t)
⊤, . . . , ezN (t)
⊤]⊤, Qz = diag(q
z
1, q
z
2, . . . , q
z
N ),
az(t) = [a
1
z (t)
⊤, a2z (t)
⊤, . . . , aNz (t)
⊤]⊤, and aiz(t) =∑
j∈Ni
ajiz (t
j
kj
) for i = 1, . . . , N .
Theorem 3: Let the Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Consider
the MAS (8) and the detector (22) under cyber attack
free conditions, with the triggering function parameters (24)
satisfy 0 < cz and 0 < α < −maxRe(λ(A˜z)), where λ(A˜z)
denotes the eigenvalue of A˜z = IN ⊗Az−∆z⊗Fz, and ∆z
can be computed in a similar manner as described for ∆ in
the proof of Theorem 1, where the Laplacian matrix is now
L. The detectors in (25) reach a consensus if and only if
Az − λiFz, i = 2, . . . , N , are Hurwitz, where λi 6= 0 is the
i-th eigenvalue of L. Moreover, the detector (25) does not
exhibit Zeno behavior under attack free conditions.
Proof: Under cyber attack free conditions the expres-
sion (25) can be rewritten as
z˙(t) =(IN ⊗Az − L⊗ Fz)z(t) + (IN ⊗Bz)xˆ(t)
− (L⊗ Fz)ez(t),
Following along the derivations in [14], and since by
definition the triggering function (24) does not cross zero
in the interval t ∈ [tiki , tiki+1), we have ‖ezi(t)‖ < cze−αt,
which implies that ‖ez(t)‖ <
√
Ncze
−αt. Therefore, it can
be concluded that ‖ez(t)‖ → 0 as t→∞.
In a similar manner as in the proof of Theorem 1, let
us define the disagreement vector δz(t) = z(t) − (1Nr⊤ ⊗
In)z(t). Since under cyber attack free conditions states of
the observers xˆ(t) reach a consensus and 1N is the right
eigenvector corresponding to the zero for IN − 1Nr⊤, it
follows that δ˙z(t) is independent of xˆ(t) once the agents
reach a consensus.
Let us define εz(t) = (T
−1
z ⊗ In)δz(t) =
[εz1(t)
⊤, εz2:N (t)
⊤]⊤. Similar to the proof of the Theorem 1
it can be shown that εz1(t) = 0n and
ε˙z2:N (t) = (IN⊗Az−∆z⊗Fz)εz2:N (t)−(∆zWz⊗Fz)ez2:N(t),
(26)
where ez2:N (t) = [e
z
2(t)
⊤, . . . , ezN (t)
⊤]⊤, Tz ∈ RN×N , Yz ∈
R
N×N−1, Wz ∈ RN−1×N , and the block diagonal matrix
∆z ∈ RN−1×N−1 has diagonal entries that are equal to the
nonzero eigenvalues of L such that Tz = [1N Yz], T
−1
z =[
r⊤
Wz
]
and T−1z LTz = Jz =
[
0 01×N−1
0N−1 ∆z
]
.
Following along the proof of Theorem 1, it can be shown
that (26) is stable if and only if Az−λiFz, for i = 2, . . . , N ,
are Hurwitz.
To show that (25) does not exhibit the Zeno behavior
one needs to show that the inter-event intervals are lower
bounded. The solution to (26) can be derived as follows:
εz2:N (t) = e
A˜ztεz2:N (0)+
∫ t
0
eA˜z(t−τ)(∆zWz⊗Fz)ez2:N (τ)dτ,
where A˜z = IN ⊗Az −∆z ⊗Fz. From the Lemma 2, it can
be concluded that
‖εz(t)‖ = ‖εz2:N(t)‖ ≤ α3eλ
m
A˜z
t
+ α2e
−αt, (27)
where α3 = α1 + α2, α1 = cA˜znN‖PA˜z‖‖P−1A˜z ‖‖εz(0)‖,
α2 = (cA˜znN‖PA˜z‖‖P−1A˜z ‖‖∆zWz⊗Fz‖
√
Ncz)/(|α+λmA˜z |),
cA˜z > 0 is a positive constant, and maxRe(λ(A˜z)) <
λm
A˜z
< −α < 0. It follows from (27) that ‖δz(t)‖ ≤ ‖Tz ⊗
In‖‖εz(t)‖ ≤ β1eλ
m
A˜z
t
+ β2e
−αt, where β1 = ‖Tz ⊗ In‖α3
and β2 = ‖Tz ⊗ In‖α2.
In the interval t ∈ [tiki , tiki+1) the dynamics of ez(t) can
be expressed as
e˙z(t) = (IN⊗Az−L⊗Fz)ez(t)−(IN⊗Bz)xˆ(t)−(L⊗Fz)z(t).
Let us define δe(t) = ez(t) − (1Nr⊤ ⊗ In)ez(t), which is
governed by
δ˙e(t) =(IN ⊗Az − L⊗ Fz)δe(t)− ((IN − 1Nr⊤)⊗Bz)xˆ(t)
− (L⊗ Fz)δz(t).
Since it is assumed that the MAS is cyber attack free, δz(t)
does not approach to zero unless ((IN − 1Nr⊤) ⊗ Bz)xˆ(t)
approaches to zero. Thus, there exists a bounded scalar
M > 0 such that ‖((IN − 1Nr⊤) ⊗Bz)xˆ(t)‖ ≤ M‖δz(t)‖.
Moreover, given that ‖IN − 1Nr⊤‖ ≥ ‖IN‖, by definition
one can conclude that ‖ez(t)‖ ≤ ‖δe(t)‖. Therefore, it
implies that
‖e˙z(t)‖ ≤‖δ˙e(t)‖ ≤ ‖IN ⊗Az − L⊗ Fz‖‖IN − 1Nr⊤‖
× ‖ez(t)‖ + ‖L⊗ Fz‖‖δz(t)‖
+ ‖((IN − 1Nr⊤)⊗Bz)xˆ(t)‖ ≤ gz(t),
where gz(t) , a1e
λm
A˜z
t
+ a2e
−αt, a1 = (‖L⊗ Fz‖+M)β1,
and a2 = (‖L⊗Fz‖+M)β2+
√
N‖IN⊗Az−L⊗Fz‖‖IN−
1Nr
⊤‖.
Let t∗ denote the latest triggering instant and con-
sider τ∗ = t − t∗ as the time-interval between the two
latest triggered events. Given that at the triggering in-
stant f zi (t, e
z
i(t)) = 0, it can be concluded that in the
i-th detector the next event cannot be triggered before
‖ezi(t)‖ = cze−αt, that implies ‖ez(t)‖ = ‖
∫ t
t∗
e˙z(s)ds‖ ≤∫ t
t∗
gz(s)(s)ds =
√
Ncze
−αt. Since t∗ ≥ t, we have
e−αt ≤ e−αt∗ and eλmA˜z t ≤ eλmA˜z t∗ . Consequently, τ∗ is
lower bounded by τ¯ , which is the solution to the equation
(a1e
λm
A˜z
t∗
+a2e
−αt∗)τ¯ =
√
Ncze
−α(t∗+τ¯), that is equivalent
to (a1e
(λm
A˜z
+α)t∗
+ a2)τ¯ =
√
Ncze
−ατ¯ .
Since 0 < α < |λm
A˜z
| < −maxRe(λ(A˜z)), there exists
τ˜ such that τ∗ ≥ τ¯ ≥ τ˜ , where τ˜ is the strictly positive
solution to the equation (a1+ a2)τ˜ =
√
Ncze
−ατ˜ . Hence, τ˜
is the lower bound on the inter-event times of the detector
(22), which implies that there are no Zeno behavior. This
completes the proof of the theorem.
Definition 8: A cyber attack injected to the closed-loop
MAS (3) and the observer (4) is detected if the residual
signal
resiz(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
‖zj(tjkj )− zi(tiki) + qjiajiz (t)‖, (28)
satisfies the inequality ‖resiz(t)‖ > ηz, where ηz is the cyber
attack detection threshold.
Assumption 6: The adversaries do not have knowledge on
the parameters of the event-triggered detector (22). Hence,
they are not capable of designing ajiz (t
j
kj
) such that zj(t
j
kj
)−
zi(t
i
ki
) + qjia
ji
z (t
j
kj
) = 0 as tjkj →∞.
Remark 4: Since agents communicate their state detectors
according to the triggering function (24), the adversary does
not have access to these states continuously. Consequently,
it is quite reasonable to assume that the adversary does not
have knowledge of the exact values of the parameters in (22).
Corollary 1: Consider the Assumptions 1-6 hold and the
MAS (8) is under quasi-covert cyber attacks as introduced
in the Lemma 3. Given that the triggering function (24) has
parameters that are provided in the Theorem 3, let the cyber
attack signal be denoted by ajiz (t
j
kj
) = az0−eAz(t−t
j
kj
)
zj(t
j
kj
)
for i ∈ Vda and j ∈ Vnc, where az0 ∈ Rn is a constant vector.
Consequently, the generated residual (28) by the k-th agent
is nonzero if k ∈ Va or k ∈ Vnca, and Bz is full column rank,
and Az − λqFz, for q = 2, . . . , N , are Hurwitz in detectors
(25), where λq is defined as in Theorem 3.
Proof: Suppose Bz is a full column rank matrix and
Az − λqFz, for q = 2, . . . , N , are Hurwitz. Consequently,
following along the steps as in proof of Theorem 2, the
detectors that belong to the set Va do not reach az0 as the
consensus set point since dynamics of the virtual adversary
agent does not have Bzxˆi. Hence, cyber attacks are detectable
by using the detectors of agents that belong to this set.
Since under cyber attacks the agents observers states do
not reach a consensus, δ˙z(t) in the proof of Theorem 3
depends on xˆ(t), which implies that the detectors do not
reach a consensus as well and the cyber attacks are detectable
on the set Vnca. This completes the proof of the corollary.
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATION CASE STUDY
In this case study, cyber attacks that are introduced in
the Theorem 2 and the quasi-covert cyber attacks in the
Lemma 3 are investigated. Moreover, the effectiveness of
event triggered detector that was proposed in Section V in
detecting the quasi-covert cyber attacks is demonstrated and
illustrated. A MAS consisting of 6 agents along with their
observer-based consensus protocols having the dynamics
as given in (1) and (2), respectively, with the following
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Fig. 1. Residuals of agents while the cyber attacks are injected at t = 10
(s).
parameters are studied [5] in:
A =
[−2 2
−1 1
]
, B =
[
1
0
]
, C =
[
1 0
0 1
]
,
F =
[
15 0
15 15
]
, K =
[
2 −10] , c = −2.
The Laplacian matrix of the communication links among
agents is given by L =[1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0; -1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0; -1,
0, 2, -1, 0, 0; 0, -1, 0, 2, 0, -1; 0, 0, -1, 0, 1, 0; 0, 0, 0, 0,
-1, 1]. The detector parameters in (22) are Az =
[−1 0
0 −2
]
,
Bz = I2 × 5, Fz = I2 × 10, cz = 0.002, and α = 0.2.
Agents 1 and 2 are the roots of the spanning trees as
contained in graph G of the network. In this case study,
agents 4 and 5 are directly under cyber attacks such that
Vda = {4, 5}, Va = {4, 5, 6}, Vnc = {1, 2, 3}, and Vnca = {3}.
In Fig. 1, the residuals of agents in presence of cyber
attacks as introduced in the Theorem 2 are shown. After the
occurrence of the cyber attack at t = 10 (s) it is detected
by the agent 3 that belongs to the set Vnca, whereas it is
undetectable by the rest of network agents.
The impacts of the quasi-covert cyber attack on MAS are
illustrated in Fig. 2. As can be observed in this figure the
agent 3 states after the quasi-covert cyber attack is injected at
t = 30 (s) reach to those of the agents 1 and 2. Consequently,
this cyber attack is undetectable on the entire network as
shown in Fig. 3. By using the event-triggered detectors that
are proposed in (22), the residuals (28) are generated and
shown in Fig. 4. It follows from this figure that all agents’
residuals that belong to the set Va are nonzero and exceed
the threshold ηz = 3. Moreover, the agent 3 residual exceeds
the threshold as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, detectability of cyber attacks on the com-
munication links of certain teams of multi-agent systems has
been investigated. A definition that can be used to specify
undetectable cyber attacks on MAS was developed and
proposed. It was shown that cyber attacks on communication
links of the root of a directed spanning tree graph are
undetectable. Moreover, cyber attacks on the non-root agents
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Fig. 2. States of agents in presence of cyber attacks at t = 10 (s) and
quasi-covert cyber attacks at t = 30 (s).
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Fig. 3. Residuals approach to zero after occurrence of the quasi-covert
cyber attacks at t = 30 (s).
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Fig. 4. Residuals that are generated by using the event-triggered detectors
and exceed the threshold in presence of quasi-covert cyber attacks injected
at t = 30 (s).
were investigated. It was shown that cyber attacks on non-
root agents can be detected by the set of agents provided that
one can determine an uncompromised directed path from the
root of the graph to these agents. Novel quasi-covert cyber
attacks were introduced that can be injected to maintain and
ensure these attacks on non-root agents remain undetectable
by the entire network. Finally, an event-triggered detector
was proposed that is capable of detecting quasi-covert cyber
attacks. A challenging topic for future investigation is to
study event-triggered detectors and detection of cyber attacks
in presence of disturbances, noise, and uncertainties.
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